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"Government by Judiciary": What
Price Legitimacy?
By Louis LusKy*

Introduction
Raoul Berger's Government by Judiciary' valuably reminds us that
an uncompromising morality fixes the conditions of governmental legitimacy. It reminds us to be vigilant against judicial usurpation. In
Catonian terms no longer often heard, it inveighs against usurpations
perceived. And, for every lawyer over the age of about 35, it provides a
nostalgic reminder of the simpler standard of legitimacy-based on the
holy teachings of Marbury v. Madison2-- that Raoul Berger and I both
learned in law school. Beyond all this, the book (albeit unintentionally) demonstrates how inadequate the Marbury approach has now become. It demonstrates how completely that approach fails to satisfy the
basic requirement of utility in constitutional analysis, as applied to the
state of affairs that the Supreme Court has created in the last quartercentury, a state of affairs which even the Nixon and Ford appointees
(along with the American people) have accepted as largely irreversible.
A fortuitous circumstance has given the book a special 6clat. Its
wide distribution is at least partly attributable to the recognition Raoul
Berger earned during the Watergate crisis through his timely though
sometimes criticized historical studies of executive privilege and impeachment. 3 This matters not at all; what does matter is that the book
* A.B. 1935, University of Louisville; LL.B. 1937, Columbia Law School; Betts Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
I am deeply indebted to Walter Gellhorn, Betts Professor of Law Emeritus, for useful
editorial suggestions and wise counsel-the more so because he disagrees with some of the
things I say.
1. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY].
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974) and IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973). See also Berger, Executive Privilege:
A Repol to ProfessorSofaer, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1975); Sofaer, Book Review, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 281 (1974).
©1979, Louis Lusky. All rights reserved.
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(despite what I believe to be serious flaws) has crystallized for millions
of non-lawyers the fear that the Court has jumped the bounds of legitimate judicial review and is pursuing a course that bears dismaying resemblance to the excesses of the pre-1937 Court-the "Nine Old Men"
who nearly crippled the New Deal of Franklin Roosevelt. People who
have shrunk from tackling the scholarly commentaries that have
sounded this warning with increasing persistence,4 have been willing
and able to read Government by Judiciary, or at least have paid attention to the newspaper and television analyses of its thesis.'
Raoul Berger's argument is simple. The pivotal proposition is that
a court, in determining the meaning and effect of a constitutional provision, should approach its task in precisely the same way as if it were
interpreting a statute. That is to say, its key inquiry should be: what
were the written words intended to mean by those who employed
them? Berger makes his position clear at the very outset:
[T]he "original intention" of the Framers ... is binding on the
Court for the reason earlier stated by Madison: if "the sense in
which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the Nation
• . . be not the guide in expounding it, there can be no security
for a consistent and stable [government], more than for a faithful
exercise of its powers." 6
Later in his Introduction he dispels any lingering doubt that, for him,
constitutional application and statutory interpretation involve the same
process: "On traditional canons of interpretation, the intention of the
[F]ramers being unmistakably expressed, that intention is as good as
written into the text."7 And in the footnote supporting this statement,
Berger cites three statutory interpretation cases, decided respectively in
1845, 1861 and 1903, and the seventh edition of Bacon's Abridgment,
published in 1832.8
As every schoolboy knows-every law student, anyway-Chief
4. A fair number of them are cited in L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§§ 1-8, 3-6 (1978). See also text accompanying notes 40-45 infra.
5. For example, Raoul Berger was questioned for nearly an hour on the "Firing Line"
program of William F. Buckley, Jr. The program was originally telecast by Public Broadcasting System on October 28, 1977.
6. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 3 (footnote omitted).
7. Id. at7.
8. Id. at 7 n.24. This footnote reads as follows: "A thing may be w ithin the letter of a
statute and not within its meaning, and within its meaning though not within its letter. The
intention of the lawmaker is the law. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903); United
States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 565 (1845); United States v. Babbitt, 66 U.S. 55, 61
(1861); Matthew Bacon, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, "Statutes" 1(5)
(7th ed. 1832); infra Chapter 9 note 22." Berger's footnote 22 in Chapter 9 reads simply, "Id.
[referring to the CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1865-66)] 506".
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Justice Marshall declared for a unanimous Court in McCulloch v. Marylandg: "[W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding."' 0 He delivered this admonition in response to a contention
based on strict construction of article I, section 8, which the state of
Maryland maintained should be interpreted in the same way as a statute. Marshall flatly repudiated this notion; he pointed out that the
Constitution is a wholly different type of instrument. Superficially,
therefore, it might seem that Raoul Berger's view is a legal coelacanth,
a living fossil. At first blush he appears hardly to have entered the
nineteenth century. But closer consideration shows this to be wrong.
Better documentation was available to him than he elected to use. The
fact is that the great Chief Justice would have agreed fully with his
essential point: that the Constitution should be applied in accordance
with the intent of those who made it. The famous McCulloch dictum
was uttered not to justify judicial disregard of the original intent, but to
repel the suggestion that the Constitution ought to speak with the same
specfciM y as a statute ordinarily does. Here is what shortly precedes
that dictum:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means
by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of
the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by
the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the
public. Its nature therefore, requires, that only its great outlines
should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from
the nature of the objects themselves."
One must nevertheless undertake a modest amount of time travel
in order to reach back to the period when the Berger view was at least
nominally accepted by the Court, and when its consequences remained
acceptable to the American people. Not as far back as 1935, when I
studied Constitutional Law at Columbia Law School, or the transitional 1937 Term of the Supreme Court, when I served as law clerk to
Justice Harlan F. Stone, or even (paceRaoul Berger) 1954, when Brown
v. Boardof Education'2 was decided. It would probably be necessary,
however, to look to the period before 1961, when Mapp v. Ohio13 began
the "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amend9. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

10. Id. at 407 (emphasis in original).
II. Id.
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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ment; almost certainly before 1962, when Baker v. Carr 4 rewrote the
standards ofjusticiability and gave new content to the equal protection
clause; clearly before 1964, when Reynolds v. Sims"5 proclaimed oneperson-one-vote as an equal protection doctrine, in the teeth of Justice
Harlan's irrefutable and unrefuted demonstration in dissent that the
Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to protect the right to vote,
much less to guarantee that all votes have equal weight; and, by the
Court's own admission, before 1965. That was the date of Linkletter v.
Walker,'6 the first "prospectivity" case, in which the Court was driven
to acknowledge that when Mapp v. Ohio overruled Wolf v. Colorado'7
and held that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the introduction of
illegally seized evidence at a state criminal trial, "[ilt was the judgment
of this Court [and not a reinterpretation of the intent of the Framers]
that changed the rule."' 8
Looking back, one perceives that by 1965 the Court had quietly
accomplished two basic shifts in its approach to constitutional adjudication, and had thereby broadened the scope of judicial review by a
full order of magnitude. One of the two-assertion of the power to
revise the Constitution, bypassing the cumbersome amendment procedure prescribed by article V-has already been noted: that power was
exercised in such cases as Mapp v. Ohio, Baker v. Carr, Reynolds v.
Sims, and Linkletter v. Walker. The second basic shift was repudiation
of the limits on judicial review that are implicit in the orthodox doctrine of Marbury v. Madison.19
The teaching of the Marbury case, to which the Court even now
pays lip service but which has been superseded in the same manner that
Newton's physical laws have been superseded by Einstein's, was that
judicial review amounts to nothing more than the adjudication of lawsuits on the basis of the most authoritative governmental command
that is available and applicable. The decision was a landmark primarily because it recognized the Constitution as a source, indeed the most
authoritative source, of legal rights, that is, rights enforceable by courts,
and not merely as a source of political "rights," which can be thought
of as being "enforceable" through the ballot, or by passive resistance or
civil disobedience or, in the last resort, by revolution. But Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion for the unanimous Court, before reaching this bold
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

369 U.S. 186 (1962).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
381 U.S. 618 (1965).
338 U.S. 25 (1949).
381 U.S. at 639.
5 U.S. (ICranch) 137 (1803).
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position, first took pains to demonstrate that Marbury did indeed have
a cause of action-derived from the common law and valid federal
statute, not from the Constitution-that entitled him to an adjudica-

tion, a court ruling.
Beginning in 1962 with Baker v. Carr,2 ° the Court has more and
more freely disregarded the limitation on judicial review that results
from refusing to decide constitutionality unless the plaintiff has stated a

claim that would entitle him to judicial relief if nothing in the Constitution affected the decision.2" In the Baker case, the Court resorted to the
Constitution itself as the source of a legal right previously unknown to

the law-a right against unjustifiable dilution of the weight of one's
vote-in ordertoprovidea basisforjudicialreview under the equal pro-

tection clause. Since then, on the questionable ground that the Court

22
is, by its own assertion, the "ultimate interpreter" of the Constitution,

it has held that legal rights flow from a variety of constitutional provisions, including article I, section 2, clause 1,23 the Fourth Amendment,2 4 and article I, section 2, clause 2.25 The logic of these decisions

is extensible to many other clauses, though the Court has
thus far
26
somewhat arbitrarily refused to apply it to some of them.

Government by Judiciary ignores these two seismic changes 27 that

have taken place in the last twenty years or less, or at least assumes that
they are fully reversible and may indeed be wiped away if shown to be
20. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
21. Very few constitutional provisions impose legal duties on private persons. The exceptions are the Thirteenth and the now repealed Eighteenth Amendment, prohibiting, respectively, slavery, The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883), and traffic in intoxicating
liquors, National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386-87 (1920). The express wording of
the Amendments has been held to require the exceptional result.
22. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969).
23. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964). Art. I, § 2, cl. 1 provides: "The House
of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People
of the several States . .. ."
24. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971). The Fourth
Amendment reads: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
25. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 491 (1969). Art. I, § 2, cl. 2 states: "No Person
shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and
been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an
Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen."
26. E.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (statement and account
clause, art. I, § 9, cl. 7); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208
(1974) (incompatibility clause, art. I, § 6, cl. 2).
27. See text accompanying notes 13-19 supra.
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contrary to the original intention. It is clear that Raoul Berger deplores
these changes and, if he had the power, would undo them with respect
to the whole Constitution as amended, not the Fourteenth Amendment
alone.2" His thesis, I freely acknowledge, strikes a responsive chord
with me, as it doubtless does with many other lawyers who finished law
school before 1965 or thereabouts. I must also admit that not until the
early 1970s did I recognize the inadequacy of the Marbury doctrine of
judicial review and then begin explaining to my Constitutional Law
students the Court's new and grander conception of its own place in the
governmental scheme. Such is the persistence of familiar ways and accustomed thought patterns.
In a moment I shall explain why I believe that the Berger prescription for legitimacy is not the only one possible, and indeed is not the
most useful one. I shall outline the proposal I first offered in By What
Right? A Commentary on the Supreme Court'sPower to Revise the Constitution.2 9 There I mapped a different road to judicial legitimacy, one
making use of the concept of impliedjudicialpowerto make new constitutional rules under certain objectively verifiable conditions. Even
while advancing my thesis,.however, I was constrained to acknowledge
the hazard it entails:
Certainly the danger of judicial usurpation would make it
desirable to avoid the implication of judicial power if there were
any way to do it without incurring still less tolerable risks; were
we drafting a new Constitution, we would surely try to find a way
to preclude the implication of judicial power-which probably
could only be accomplished by precluding the need for it. But we
deal with an existing constitution, and so our opinion as to the
legitimacy of implied judicial power must turn on the single
question whether it is less hazardous to societal welfare than any
visible alternative.3 0
Moreover, I could not refrain from hinting at my own nostalgic regret
that the Court-under the pressure of forces that threatened utter disruption of our society, caught as it was between the Scylla of majority
rule and the Charybdis of individual freedom with only an eighteenth
century Constitution and the nineteenth century Civil War Amendments to steer by-had been driven beyond the straightforward, orthodox conception of judicial review that Berger and I were taught in law
school:
Note that my objective is to show that the principle of im28. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 6-8 suvra.
29. L. LUSKY, By WHAT RIGHT? A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S
TO REVISE THE CoNsTrrUTiON (1975) [hereinafter cited as BY WHAT RIGHT?]
30. Id. at 24.

POWER
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plied judicial power can be used to evaluate the Court's work and
can therefore serve to defend the Court from the accusation that
it has cast off all restraint and set itself above the law. There is no
need for me to say whether I believe that the need to justify the
Court's decisions on the basis of implied judicial power is cause
for rejoicing, ie., that the public interest has been better served
by the Court's actual performance than it would have been
served by its adherence to the Constitutional text. (Copernicus
might have regretted that the Ptolemaic conception of the solar
system was so hard to reconcile with [the actual] astronomical
observations; but would this have justified him in remaining
silent?)3 1
One point remains to be made before discussion of the merits of
Raoul Berger's thesis. The narrow scope that is promised by his subtitle, "The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment," and articulated in his Introduction is curiously incongruous with the broad scope
of his actual jurisprudential assumptions. The first paragraph of the
Introduction declares:
The Fourteenth Amendment is the case study par excellence
of what [the second] Justice Harlan described as the Supreme
Court's "exercise of the amending power," its continuing revision
of the Constitution under the guise of interpretation. Because the
Amendment is probably the largest source of the Court's business
and furnishes the chief fulcrum for its control of controversial
policies, the question whether such control is authorized by the
Constitution is of great practical importance.32
Though Fourteenth Amendment decisions may well be numerically
preponderant, they by no means cover the entire constitutional spectrum. They deal with cases of state action (or inaction); but they do not
involve problems of separation of powers, such as the Nixon tapes controversy and the unresolved problem of veto by Congress or one house
of Congress, nor the ongoing debate concerning "state rights," nor even
individual rights vis A.vis the federal government, problems which today are at least as important as those arising in the several states.
Still more pertinent for present purposes is the fact that Raoul Berger's tunnel vision leads naturally to a historian's appraisal of the
Court's performance. He has won his academic laurels mainly as a
legal historian, and it is doubtless natural for him to seek out the "original understanding" of those who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment
(a useful, though not highly original, exercise) and insist upon it as the
31. Id. at 270 n.*. In the first printing, the observations were erroneously said to be
those of Tycho Brahe, an anachronism that was corrected in the Foreword to the second
printing. Id. at viii.
32. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at I (footnotes omitted).
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sole touchstone of legitimate application of the Amendment (a narrow
and, in my opinion, a useless and even destructive endeavor). Thus, he
devotes the bulk of his book to the Amendment's legislative history,
reserving only two chapters for justification of his basic approach. He
entitles chaper 20, "Why the 'Original Intention'?", and in chapter 21,
after brushing aside a few straw men,33 he gets down to the serious
business of countering the alternative approaches proposed in 1975 by
Professor Thomas C. Grey in his article, "Do We Have an Unwritten
Constitution?"3 4 and by the present writer in By Wat Right?. This he
accomplishes, to his own apparent satisfaction, in a scant ten pages.
This is not the place for a full-dress debate on the validity of
Raoul Berger's contention that history provides the only, or at least the
predominant, test of the legitimacy of judicial review. Instead, I shall
take note of the various efforts (of which mine is only one) to show that
history is at best one factor to be considered in formulating a useful
test. I shall also point out, somewhat more fully than does Berger,
some of the practical effects that would ensue if his prescription were
followed.
I.

Theories of Legitimate Judicial Review

It has become almost de rigueur to start any review of the scholarly
appraisals of modem judicial review by tossing a bouquet or a brickbat
in Professor Herbert Wechsler's direction. His 1959 Holmes Lecture,
delivered at Harvard Law School and later published both as an article
in the HarvardLawReview and as the centerpiece of Principles,Politics,
and Fundamental Law,3 5 affirmed the view that all judicial actions
should be governed by "neutral principles." Actually, he was not and
did not claim to be the first to concern himself with the legitimacy of
the Court's performance. His lecture explicitly responded to the
Holmes Lecture delivered by Judge Learned Hand the year before,
36
which raised the same question but came up with a different answer.
In 1942, an article of mine in the Yale Law Journalhad grappled with
33. Berger demonstrates that certain dicta of Chief Justice Marshall and Justices
Holmes and Frankfurter afford no support for the view that the Court has the power to
revise the Constitution. See id. at 373-86.
34. 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975). Evidently the author had not seen my article, The
Unwritten U.S. Constitution,N.Y.L.J, Aug. 31 & Sept. 1, 1972, at 1, col. 5 (two part article).
35. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959), reprintedin H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 3 (1961).
36. See L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
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the identical problem, also without claiming to be the first to do so. 7
What has given Professor Wechsler's statement its central position
is the force and elegance of his argument. Exception has been taken to
the term "neutral principles" on the ground that it is redundant, every
"principle" being "neutral" by definition. On the contrary, a "principle" can be constructed ad hoc in the form of a major premise that is
adequate to rationalize a desired result in a particular case, but it lacks
"neutrality" if the court stands ready to construct a different "principle" in the next case, as Justice Brennan has repeatedly done or sought
to do in the pornography cases.3 8 That, however, is a verbal quibble.
More serious is the charge that since any constitutional principle must
be value-laden (which I believe to be true), therefore it cannot be "neutral." This proposition, I submit, is a non sequitur. As I understand
the Wechsler lecture, it uses the term "neutral" not to mean value-free
but to mean both capable of consistent application because objectively
verifiable, in the sense that an outsider can detect judicial deviations
from it, and in fact consistently applied.
If my understanding is correct, the Wechsler submission affords no
basis for choice between Raoul Berger's test of legitimacy and alternative tests such as that proposed in By What Right?.3 9 Each of them
insists that courts ought to be guided by principle, that a judge should
recognize the constraint of something outside his own conception of the
public welfare and his calculation as to what his court can get away
with. What Professor Wechsler rejects, as do Berger and I, is the notion
that the Supreme Court can legitimately function as a continuing constitutional convention enjoying the totalfreedom that such a convention,
fregularly established,wouldpossess.
The list of scholars who have wrestled with the problem of the
legitimacy of judicial review as actually practiced by the Supreme
Court is too long to set forth here. It includes, in addition to those
already named, such eminent legal analysts as Alexander Bickel,
Charles L. Black, Archibald Cox, John Hart Ely, Paul A. Freund, Lino
A. Graglia, Thomas C. Grey, James Willard Hurst, Leonard W. Levy,
Louis H. Pollak, Frank R. Strong and Laurence H. Tribe-to mention
only those whose writings are most discussed today.4 0 They fall into
37. Lusky, Minority Rights and the PublicInterest, 52 YALE L.J. 1 (1942).
38. Compare Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (Brennan, J., for the
Court) with Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (Brennan, J., for a "plurality" of three Justices) and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73-74, 113 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. By WHAT RIGHT?, supra note 29.
40. The most influential writings on the subject are discussed in GOVERNMENT BY JUDI-
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three groups. Some, such as Levy 4 ' and Grey,4 2 have argued against
the necessity of "neutral principles." Others have argued that "neutral
principles," though necessary, have in fact been adhered to for the most
part. For example, Black finds the unwritten principles in propositions
derived from the institutional structure created by the Constitution,4 3
and Strong finds them in propositions based on the necessity of avoiding societal breakdown.' Finally, Berger, who insists that the sole acceptable "neutral principle" is adherence to the original understanding
wherever it is ascertainable, and perhaps Graglia, who confines himself
to the narrow field of the desegregation decisions, 45 appear to believe
that the Court has engaged in usurpation on a wholesale basis.
I am in the second of the three groups. Members of the first, in my
opinion, overlook several important considerations, including the fragility of judicial review. This fragility results partly from the fact that
the Court's effectiveness is linked directly to the willingness of nearly
all Americans to comply voluntarily with its pronouncements on the
law, which in turn depends directly on their belief that the Court
speaks for the Constitution (including, but not limited to, the written
text) and not merely for the wishes of a majority of nine non-elected,
politically appointed officials who preside over a marble temple and
wear priestly robes. That fragility results also from the fact that the
voters, if aroused to indignant resistance against perceived usurpation,
can and surely will cause their delegates in Congress to employ their
undoubted authority to strip away virtually all power of the federal
courts to engage in judicial review.46 Members of the first group also
overlook or underrate, I think, the value of judicial review and the loss
that would befall us if abuses led to its abolition or undue constriction.
In By What Right? I explained why I believe wholesome judicial review
to be a valuable national resource;4 7 that explanation need not be rech. 19, and L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1,L LAW (1978), especially in ch. 1.
41. L. LEvy, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN 7, 10-11 (1972) and
AGAINST THE LAW 25-36 (1974).
42. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
CIARY, especially in

43. See, e.g., C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(1969).
44. Strong, Bicentennial Benchmark: Two Centuries of Evolution of Constitutional
Processes,55 N.C.L. REv. 1, 98-113 (1976). Probably the most recently published exposition of this viewpoint is John Hart Ely's incisive article, ConstitutionalInterpretivism Its
Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1978).
45. L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE

(1976).
46. By WHAT RIGHT?, supra note 29, at 29-30.
47. Id. at 38-43.

AND THE SCHOOLS
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peated here.
Raoul Berger and other members (if any) of the third group err, I
believe, in the opposite direction. They appear to underestimate the
value of the Court's work over the last four decades in conforming the
Constitution to what its makers would, I submit-given their political
philosophy, which included commitment to self-government and the
open society-have prescribed for the United States of America had
they been living and acting in the middle of the 20th century. Berger's
insistence that the Court can only reestablish its legitimacy by overruling Brown v. Board of Education and the desegregation rulings it has
spawned, by overruling Baker v. Carr and the state legislative reapportionment decisions to which it has led and by overruling the criminal
procedure cases which, utilizing the "selective incorporation" fiction,
have humanized the criminal process in state prosecutions, demands a
heavy price. Were we to follow the Berger recommendation with respect to desegregation, it is entirely likely that the huge and increasingly well-organized nonwhite minority would write finis to the open
society. At the risk of seeming needlessly alarmist I say that though
they lack the numbers and military strength to mount an armed revolt,
nonwhites are fully capable of creating such civil disorder that wholesale searches, arrests without probable cause, official censorship, and
other police state trappings would be thought essential for societal survival here, as they were in Italy during the spring of 1978 when Aldo
Moro was kidnaped and killed. Public reaction to overruling the reapportionment and "incorporation" cases would be less immediate and is
less predictable, but in the long run it might be quite as destructive.
Moreover, the price would not only be heavy; it would also be unnecessary, given the fact that the people at large have accepted the legitimacy of the basic decisions claiming enlarged judicial power, however
48. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 69-98, 117-33, 134-56 (chs. 5, 7 & 8). The grudging
acknowledgment in the concluding chapter, pp. 407-18, that these decisions cannot and
probably should not be overruled does not modify Berger's opinion that they were usurpations: "It would, however, be utterly unrealistic and probably impossible to undo the past in
the face of the expectations that the segregation decisions, for example, have aroused in our
black citizenry-expectations confirmed by every decent instinct. That is more than the
courts should undertake and more, I believe, than the American people would desire. But to
accept thus far accomplished ends is not to condone the continued employment of the unlawful means. If the cases listed by Grey are in fact in contravention of the Constitution, the
difficulty of a rollback cannot excuse the continuation of such unconstitutional practices."
Id. at 412-13 (emphasis in original). Since the remaining five pages of the book are a philippie against judicial usurpation, including a warning that "[t]he nation cannot afford to countenance a gap between word and deed on the part of its highest tribunal," id. at 417, the
seeming acquiescence in past decisions can be no more than a concession toforce majeure.
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they may have questioned and passively resisted some recent extreme
applications of those basic decisions. And so, as I have said, I find
myself in the second group-those who recognize the necessity of "neutral principles" and believe that the Court's performance evinces respect for them in the main, albeit with regrettable aberrations that can
be repudiated without social loss, and ought to be. I shall briefly explain the difference between my views and those of my fellow groupmembers.
Two of them, Professors Black and Strong, have evidently attributed the same importance as do I to the formulation of objectively verifiable principles. I have found the Black concept of "structure"-derived
constitutional rules,4 9 and the-Strong concept of rules based on societal
necessity, 50 to be helpful in my thinking and teaching. My own writing
can be regarded as an effort to develop a "neutral principle" that is
rather more sharply drawn than theirs, and can be more confidently
used for appraisal of particular actions of the Court. I derive less nourishment from the Ninth Amendment-natural law formulation by Professor Grey,5 whose proposal was published in the Stanford Law
Review almost.simultaneously with the publication of By What Right?.
He seems to offer a rationalization for whatever the Court elects to do
rather than a criterion of legitimacy.
These observations will be made clearer by drawing a nutshell
description of the implied judicial power concept from By What Right?:
Implication of power in the Court to make constitutional
rules involves two elements. The first is a national objective
which is either spelled out in the written Constitution (notably in
the preamble), or inferable from its underlying pattern or the
known purposes of the Constitution. The second is a comprehensible reason why the Court is better fitted than other organs of
government to effectuate that objective. If either of these elements is lacking, the Court's rule is an exercise of raw power. It
does not deserve the name of law, because it does not evoke the
voluntary compliance engendered by respect for legitimate
authority.5 2
Nothing that Raoul Berger has said leads me to believe that modification of this formulation is demanded either by intellectual integrity or
by pragmatic considerations of social policy. His criticism of it appears
to be based partly on divers misunderstandings of what I say in By
49.
50.
51.
52.

See note 43 supra.
See note 44 supra.
See note 34 supra.
BY WHAT RIGHT?, supra note 29, at 107.
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W~hat Right? 3 and partly on his refusal to acknowledge that purely
historical arguments54 are intrinsically incapable of refuting my conten-

tion that history must not be the sole or even the predominant factor in
determining the legitimacy of the Court's performance.
Lest there be any doubt about this last proposition, it is well to
remember that even usurped power can eventually win recognition as

legitimate. To be sure, "the limitation period on usurpation is very
long indeed."" After enough time has passed, however, the most law-

less government or governmental measures will finally be accepted as
legitimate,5 6 and the time will be shorter if the lawlessness is tempered

by social desirability. Perhaps the most convincing example is that of
our own Constitution, which defied the unanimity requirement imposed on the 1787 Convention by the Articles of Confederation and by
the specific resolutions endowing most of the state delegations with
their authority. 57 Flying in the teeth of that requirement, the Constitution provided that it would become effective when nine states had ratified, a truly extra-legal and revolutionary act.5 8 Indeed, President
53. For example, I say that "the Court maintained its traditional passive posture down
to 1961 or 1962," id. at 274, meaning that the Court had not yet begun to create new causes
of action as vehicles for judicial review. Berger evidently misunderstands "passive posture"
and reads it to mean "self-restraint" (as opposed to activism) since he comments: "Few
would regard Brown v. BoardofEducation (1954) as exemplifying the Court's 'passive posture."' GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 392.
54. For example, he cites Hamilton's 78th Federalist, THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A.
Hamilton) 504, 506, 507, as sufficient authority to show that the Constitution can only be
legitimately changed by formal amendment. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 394-95.
55. BY WHAT RIGHT?, supranote 29, at 79.
56. See David Hume's classic statement in A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE: "Princes
often seem to acquire a right from their successors, as well as from their ancestors; and a
king, who during his lifetime might justly be deem'd an usurper, will be regarded by posterity as a lawful prince, because he has had the good fortune to settle his family on the throne,
and entirely change the antient form of government. Julius Caesaris regarded as the first
Roman emperor, while Sylla and Marius, whose titles were really the same as his, are
treated as tyrants and usurpers. Time and custom give authority to all forms of government,
and all successions of princes; and that power, which at first was founded only on injustice
and violence, becomes in time legal and obligatory. Nor does the mind rest there; but returning back upon its footsteps, transfers to their predecessors and ancestors that right,
which it naturally ascribes to the posterity, as being related together, and united in the imagination. The present King of Francemakes Hugh Capet a more lawful prince than Cromwell; as the establish'd liberty of the Dutch is no inconsiderable apology for their obstinate
resistance to Phi/@ the second." A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 566-67 (vol. III, pt. II, sec.
X) (L.A. Selby ed. 1888) (italics in original).
57. Articles of Confederation, art. 13. See 1 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES 79, 84, 126-39 (2d ed.
1836).
58. Art. VII of the Constitution provides: "The Ratification of the Conventions of nine
States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so
ratifying the Same." U.S. CONST. art. VII.
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George Washington and the First Congress took office before North
Carolina and Rhode Island ratified. Berger's logic would have it that
the whole United States Government was illegitimate down to May 29,
1790, when the thirteenth ratification (by Rhode Island) came in, and
would remain illegitimate even in 1979 if Rhode Island had withheld
ratification and, building upon the separatist precedent set by its
founder, had gone its own way as an independent nation.
I should also take a moment to pay my respects to two very recent
books of exceptional brillance by Donald L. Horowitz 9 and by Laurence H. Tribe. 6 ° Horowitz does not purport to deal with the problem
of legitimacy, but his thesis dovetails closely with my implied judicial
power test. With a keenness of perception and a precision of description that are reminiscent of de Tocqueville, he undertakes exhaustive,
multi-dimensional examination of four lawsuits-two in the Supreme
Court, 6 1 two in the courts of appeals.6 2 Three of the cases involve judicial review, the other involves application of the vague, far-ranging
Model Cities legislation. He endeavors to demonstrate, and does so to
my satisfaction, that courts are institutionally so poorly equipped to
handle polycentric cases--cases which, unlike the usual adversary litigation, have more than two "sides"--that they often fail to achieve
their professed aims and indeed sometimes unwittingly defeat them.
To use language employed by Dr. Samuel Johnson long ago in quite
another connection, constitution-making by judges "is like a dog's
walking on its hind legs. It is not done well, but you are surprised to
63
find it done at all."

Of course, it does not follow that judicial constitution-making is
intrinsically illegitimate. Rather, judicial overconfidence calls simply
for insistent reminders that constitution-making by judges is not acceptable as standard practice, but is instead a last resort-usable only
59.

D. HOROwITz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977).
60. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978).

61. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
62. North City Area-Wide Council v. Romney, Civ. No. 69-1909 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12,
1969), rev'd, 428 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1970), on remand,329 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Pa. 1971),
rev'd, 456 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. deniedsub nom. Rizzo v. North City Area-Wide
Council, 406 U.S. 963 (1972), on remand, Civ. No. 69-1909 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 1972), aI'd,
469 F.2d 1326 (3d Cir. 1972); Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal
dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968), 269 F. Supp. 401 (1967), ad sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson,
408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969),further reliefordered,320 F. Supp. 409 (1970), 320 F. Supp.
720, 327 F. Supp. 844 (1971), unreportedopinion and order denyingplainiffs"motion to hold
the defendants in contempt, Civ. No. 82-66 (D.D.C. Feb. 17, 1973).
63. Words of Samuel Johnson, July 31, 1763, quotedin J. BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON
309 (Frowde ed. 1904) (1st ed. 1791).
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when the elected branches are not merely unwilling but for some reason unable to realize a basic national objective such as preservation of
the common market, self-government, or the open society, or extirpation of slavery and its consequences. Under implied judicial power
doctrine, as has been noted,' 4 one of the two conditions of legitimate
judicial constitution-making is the statement of a comprehensible reason why courts are better fitted than other organs of government to
attain some national objective. The Justices have begun once again,
after decades of chastened restraint starting in 1937, to evince belief in
,their omnicompetence. The Horowitz book is the dash of cold water
that restores proportion and balance. It is to be hoped that the Justices
will say of the Horowitz book, as I do, "Thanks, I needed that."
The Tribe treatise does purport to offer a formula for legitimacy,
but its claim to greatness resides elsewhere. For depth of insight into
nearly all of the particular problems of constitutional law that the
Court now wrestles with, it has no close rivals. As a test of legitimacy,
however, it offers a complex seven-"model" calculus that is so intricate,
so flexible, and in some ways so metaphorical that it can easily serve as
a high-toned justification for anything the Court chooses to do. Professor Tribe gave advance notice of his legitimacy test in a law review
article entitled, The EmergingReconnection ofIndividualRights andInstitutionalDesign: Federalism,Bureaucracy, and Due Process of Lawmaking.6 5 Upon reading that article, I suspended judgment on his
approach until the appearance of his promised treatise would show
how he applied the test to the Court's post-1961 rulings. I have now
read the treatise from cover to cover-with admiration, great profit,
and only occasional doubt or disagreement. As a classroom aid it is
superb, and it must afford equally valuable help to brief-writers and
judges in the analysis of particular thorny issues. But it swallows without protest nearly all of the Court's rulings that I believe to be highly
questionable on the score of legitimacy, and in my opinion fails to contribute significantly to the formulation of a useful test. In short, I think
66
Professor Tribe sees the trees more clearly than the forest.
64. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
65. 10 CREIGHTON L. REv. 433 (1977).
66. At first blush, Professor Myres McDougal's 1977 Cardozo Lecture at the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, publishedin 33 THE RECORD [of the Association]
255 (May/June 1978), seems relevant to the question now under discussion. The Lecture
bears the intriguing title, "The Application of Constitutive Prescriptions: An Addendum to
Justice Cardozo." If Professor McDougal had in fact focused on the legitimacy problem, his
observations would surely demand the most detailed attention. Instead, however, he devoted himself to a proposal for improving the decisional process through enhanced judicial
self-awareness. In so far as he comments that By WHAT RIGHT? "would appear. . . to
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Whatever one may think of Professor Tribe's seven "models," he
himself has plainly found nothing in Government by Judiciaryon which

to build. He agrees with nearly all other scholars that, however much
we may long for the old days when general acceptance of the Marbury
theory of judicial review made constitutional analysis relatively simple

and straightforward, we cannot turn back the clock-and will not, and
should not. The critical question for today is whether an alternative
theory is available that will preserve the legitimacy of constitutional
innovation by the Court, and hence preserve judicial review itself.

II. Proof of the Pudding
To illustrate the difference between Raoul Berger's position and

my own, I shall devote the rest of this discussion to analytical comment
on the widely discussed case of Regents of the Universiy of Caiforniav.
Bakke,6 7 decided by the Supreme Court on June 28, 178. Along with

a growing number of more obscure but nonetheless more important
decisions,6 8 the Bakke case shows that the Court is not on a healthy
course. The Berger approach, I believe, can respond to those decisions

only with diffuse condemnation, not discriminating criticism. The doctrine of implied judicial power sheds light on a way out; the Berger

doctrine of "original understanding" offers only a way back to a past to
which nobody wants to return. One promises social health, the other

the tranquility of the sickbed.
At the outset, however, let us acknowledge indebtedness to Raoul
Berger for his painstaking historical study. He has presented the Four-

teenth Amendment's legislative history in thoroughly readable formafford little guidance for [a] particular decision," id. at 290 n.9, he speaks to the problem
addressed in his lecture and not to the problem addressed here. The usefulness of his prescription of detailed criteria for judges to apply in deciding particular cases depends on what
may be called their "court-worthiness"-that is, on whether such criteria would in fact control decision, as he supposes, or merely provide a convenient framework for rationalizing
any desired result. That question would provide a fit subject for another article. On the
separate question of whether judges should consider themselves bound by rules of decision
prescribed by other (elected) organs of government, Professor McDougal does not indicate
what approach he thinks provides more guidance than By WHAT RiGHT?-or, indeed, as
much. Moreover, as I have said, he does not focus on the legitimacy problem at all.
67. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
68. E.g., City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Bealv. Doe, 432 U.S. 438
(1977); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v.
Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922
(1975); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
I do not by any means suggest that the results reached in all of the cited cases are open
to criticism.
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so much more tractable than the wearisome, repetitive pages of the
CongressionalGlobe. In two respects this historical review is especially
valuable. First, it shows the central place that the privileges or immunities clause was expected to occupy-a place that the Court's opinion
in the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases69 wrongly denied it. Had it not
been for that decision, the clause would have served as a major fountainhead of congressional power.7" Second, it vividly recalls that fear
and hatred of the blacks, which Berger labels "Negrophobia," was rampant throughout the nation in 1868. 71 This review of the legislative
debates is useful both to remind us how far (though, alas, how slowly!)
we have moved toward a nonracial society, and to memorialize a
shameful chapter in our history as did the Nuremberg trials and the
Eichmann prosecution,
so that new generations of Americans will also
72
vow, "Never again!
The Bakke decision is the latest chapter in a five-year saga of burgeoning judicial activism that began, after earlier premonitory
rumblings,7" with the 1973 abortion decisions.74 Analysis of the Bakke
ruling calls for as much stamina and imperviousness to weeping as does
the peeling down of a particularly pungent onion. One must identify
the distinct legal strata that have been laid down over more than a
century of constitutional adjudication concerning the nation's commitment to racial equality-each new stratum resting on the decayed but
persistent detritus of those that preceded it. There was but one significant exception, namely the desegregation decisions beginning with
the "separate but
Brown v. Board of Education,75 which repudiated
76
equal" doctrine announced in Plessy v. Ferguson.
This preparatory survey, essential to an understanding of the problem that faced the Court in Bakke, is in itself difficult enough. Objectively evaluating time-honored precedent is an uncomfortable task.
The gentle genius Cardozo put it best: "Not lightly vacated is the ver69. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
70. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 37-51; BY WHAT RIGHT?, supra note 29, ch. XII;
Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at Last";, 1972
WASH. U.L.Q. 405.
71. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 10-16 etpassim.
72. It has been suggested that the recent litigation concerning the plan of the Nationalist
Socialist Party of America to march in Skokie, Ill., Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D.
Ill.), afl'd 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 953 (1978), may have the same
eventual result. Safire, MarchingThrough Skokie, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1978, at 19, col. 1.
73. BY WHAT RIGHT?, supra note 29, at 13-14.
74. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
75. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
76. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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dict of quiescent years." 77 But there is more. In discussing the Bakke
case I must remember to be terse. Millions of words have been written
about it78 (none by me); billions more will doubtless be written. Here I
must observe the limits set by my purpose, which is evaluation of the
Berger approach to constitutional law. Four points are to be touched
upon: (1) formulation of the problem that faced the Court, including a
consideration of what alternatives it had; (2) evaluation of the Court's
resolution of that problem, entailing a judgment as to which of the alternatives (if any) would have been wiser than the one it adopted; (3)
comment on the Justices' technical craftsmanship, as evidenced by the
decision and the several opinions; and finally, (4) admeasurement of
the substantive quality of the Court's performance against the basic
value ofjudicial review-the bridging of dangerous social schisms such
as those resulting from race, religion and nationality that are too broad
to be healed through majoritarian legislation, at least for the time
being.

79

I shall deal with the first point by simply asserting eleven propositions with a bare minimum of explanatory comment. Several of the
eleven I realize are controversial; the first two may be disputed by some
scholars, and the fourth is still disputed by most of them-a weakness
that I have reason to hope will be temporary, because this proposition
enjoys at least the partial support of Raoul Berger's formidable historical research. The eleven propositions are as follows:
(1) The primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
assure the constitutionality of the 1866 Civil Rights Acts" (enacted over
the veto of President Andrew Johnson, who denied that the Thirteenth
Amendment empowered Congress to pass it81-a position which many
members of Congress uneasily conceded might be sound)8 2 and to protect the substance of the Act from repeal after the Democratic Party
regained control of Congress. 3
(2). The substance of the 1866 Civil Rights Act was to wipe away
the vestiges of slavery as a social institution (the Thirteenth Amend77. Coler v. Corn Exch. Bank, 250 N.Y. 136, 141, 164 N.E. 882, 884 (1928), afd 280
U.S. 218 (1930).
ConstitutionalLaw, 92 HARv. L.
78. See, e.g., Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 TermREV. 57, 131 (1978).
79. By WHAT RIGHT?, supra note 29, at 38-43.
80. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 23; By WHAT RIGHT?, supra note 29, at 197.
81. Id.
82. See note 80 supra.
83. C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-1868, pt.1, at 1285 (1971).
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ment having abolished it at least as a legal institution) by declaring
native-born nonwhites as well as whites to be United States citizens
and providing them with federal protection for the central substantive
rights appurtenant to the status of citizen: "the same right to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."84
The Act was couched in terms of prohibitions against discrimination
("shall have the same right.

. .

as is enjoyed by white citizens") but the

practical effect was to put a substantive floor under the new status of
freedmen since no one supposed that white citizens would ever be
stripped of any of these central rights.
(3) Of the three main clauses contained in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 8 -the privileges or immunities clause, the due
process clause, and the equal protection clause--only the first was
designed to afford protection of substantive rights; the others were intended merely to be auxiliary to it.86
(4) In the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases,87 the Supreme Court's
first Fourteenth Amendment decision, the Court perverted the Amendment's leading purpose, and virtually beheaded it, by vitiating the privileges or immunities clause through an artificial and indefensible
"interpretation."88 There would be little ground for criticism if the
Court had done no more than render that clause unavailable as a selfexecuting mandate to the courts-a probably justifiable position that
would have been enough to support the result in the Slaughter-House
Cases. But it did far more: it disabled Congress from clearing away
the vestiges of slavery under the legislative authority granted by section
5 of the Amendment 89-a wretchedly wrongheaded position which
amounted to a hand-washing in the manner of Pontius Pilate, remitting
the freedmen to the tender mercies of state governments controlled by
84. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
85. Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment reads in full: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizeiis of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
86. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 18; Kurland, supra note 70, at 406; BY WHAT
RIGHT?, supra note 29, at 181-82, 202.
87. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
88. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 37 el seq.; BY WHAT RiGHT?, supra note 29, at 188
el seq.
89. Section5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "The Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
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their former owners, and which led to a full century of delay in beginning real progress toward a nonracial society.9 0
(5) The 1883 CivilRights Cases,9 1 following inexorably from the
Slaughter-House precedent, 92 held that Congress lacked power to forbid racial discrimination in privately owned places of public accommodation such as inns, theaters, railroad trains, and river steamers.93
Thus, only the state and local governments-for example, those of
Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi, and of Richmond, Charleston and
New Orleans-were left with constitutional power to protect blacks
from private racial discrimination. Beyond this, the Court took a second step, the importance of which is not generally recognized. It opposed the great weight of its own prestige to the view that blacks should
continue to be given more help than other socially isolated groups in
overcoming the handicap of minority status. 94 The Court thus held
that the heritage of chattel slavery had lost its social significance (patently false, even today, as most people can discern simply by examining their own attitudes), ignoring the historical fact that the plight of
the huge black minority had been a primary cause of the one real threat
to the nation's survival, and that the solution written in blood at Bull
Run, Shiloh, Antietam and Gettysburg, and formalized in the Emancipation Proclamation, had been enshrined in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments as a part of our organic law.95 By thus
ignoring history, the Court condemned us to repeat it.
(6) In 1896, Plessy v. Ferguson96 applied the clincher. The Court
there held that official segregation of the races is constitutional
if equal
97
facilities are made available to members of each race.
(7) For more than half a century the unassimilated black minority smoldered toward eruption. After World War II, when Adolf Hitler
had shown us the ugly consequences of officially endorsed racial
supremacy, when blacks had proved once more their valor in defense
90. By WHAT RIGHT?, supra note 29, at 203 et seq.

91. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
92. By WHAT RIGHT?, supra note 29, at 203-05.
93. For an account of subsequent developments, see generally C.V. WOODWARD, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955).

94. 109 U.S. at 25: "When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some
stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to
be the special favorite of the laws. .. "
95. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70-71 (1873). This historical
summary, contained in the majority opinion, evoked no dissent.
96. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
97. Id. at 544.
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of the nation, and when the Communist Party had begun to benefit
from its loud insistence on racial equality, the Court began to relent.9 8

In 1948 it denied enforcement to restrictive racial covenants, 99 and in
1953 it outlawed them."° In 1954, in Brown v. BoardofEducation,0 1 it
repudiated the "separate-but-equal" doctrine of the Plessy case as applied to public schools, but left untouched, then and thereafter, the
equally important second point in the 1883 Civil Rights Cases,"°2 thus
equating blacks with all other minorities.
(8) 'In 1955 the Court watered down Brown v. BoardofEducation
by promulgating the "deliberate speed" doctrine,1" 3 and the school de-

segregation process consequently remained at a virtual standstill in the
deep South for the next decade." ° Finally, in 1964, the Court in effect,

though not in words, repudiated the state action requirement of the
1883 CivilRights Cases 05 and gave Congress a green light for statutory

prohibition of racial discrimination in privately owned places of public
accommodation.1 0 6 Congress promptly enacted the broad Civil Rights
Act of 1964.107 However, because the state action requirement had not
been explicitly disaffirmed, the statute was grounded both on the commerce clause, whose reach had been greatly expanded since 1937,108
and on section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.10 9 It thus offered the

Court a choice of two rationales, only the latter of which embodied a
bold affirmation that all private racial discrimination in employment
and places of public accommodation is contrary to national policy.
The Court, with equal promptitude, upheld the public accommodations

provisions later that year, with most of the Justices opting for the commerce clause rationale and thus leaving the state action requirement of
98. BY WHAT RIGHT?, supra note 29, at 113-14, 211 et seq.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See text accompanying note 94 supra.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (implementation decision).
Lusky, Racial Discriminationand the Federal Law. A Problem in Nullfcation, 63

CoLUM. L. REv. 1163, 1171-72 (1963), reprintedin SOUTHERN JUSTICE 255 (L. Friedman ed.

1965).
105. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
106. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) (3-3-3 decision in a sit-in case, with six Justices agreeing that Congress has power to prohibit racial discrimination in privately owned
places of public accommodation); see BY WHAT RIGHT?., supra note 29, at 234.

107. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1976)). Quaerewhether the relationship between the Bell decision and the 1964 Act was propterhoc or merely post hoc.
108. See, e.g., Stem, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59
HARV. L. REv. 645 (1946).

109. See note 89 supra.
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the 1883 Civil Rights Cases"l0 still not explicitly disaffirmed."' The
1964 Act also followed the idea of denying special treatment to the
black minority;1 1 2 it prohibited all racial discrimination as well as discrimination based on religion or national origin or, in the case of employment, sex.
(9) In 1968, the Court inaugurated a school desegregation doctrine that has led to grotesquely destructive results. Evidently exasperated by the slowness of desegregation under the aegis of "deliberate
speed," it declared that the time for deliberateness had ended." 3 In
what amounted to a misdirected reaction as well as an over-reaction to

Southern obstructiveness, and a bold revision of history, it declared
that Brown v. Board of Education required not merely the removal of

official barriers to school desegregation but also the establishment of
"unitary" school systems in school districts where racial segregation
had been officially enforced. The actual decision in Green v. County

School Board, 4 where the "unitary school" doctrine made its appearance, was sound enough."I

The broad logic of the opinion, however,

has been applied to substitute a mechanical formula for intelligent pursuit of the strategic objective-dissolution of racial stereotypes' ' 6 -and
wantonly to wreck a number of local public school systems and outrage
perhaps the best known
the communities they serve. Boston, though
17
example, is by no means the only one.'
110. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
11. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Justices Douglas and Goldberg, in concurring opinions,
expressed their preference for the Fourteenth Amendment rationale. 379 U.S. 241, 279
(Douglas, J., concurring); 379 U.S. 241, 293 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
112. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
113. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
114. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
115. A rural county in eastern Virginia, where there was no residential segregation, had
two schools. Each of them served the whole county. The school system served about 1300
pupils, of whom about 740 were black and the rest white. A "freedom of choice" plan had
resulted in almost complete racial segregation. A plan establishing two attendance zones
would have the effect of decreasing, not increasing, the amount of busing required. 391 U.S.
at 432-35, 442 n.6 (1968).
116. See Lusky, The Stereoype: HardCore ofRacism, 13 BUFFALO L. REv. 450 (1964).
See also G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954).

117. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 30, 1978, § A at 8, col. 1 ("A Palo Alto elementary
school, praised as a model of successful integration, has been ordered closed-to maintain
racial integration. A San Francisco elementary school, also known for its innovative multicultural program, was barely saved from closing in a recent district-vide reorganization
plan designed to insure racial balance."); report of David J. Armor of the Rand Corporation, White Flight,DemographicTransition andthe FutureofSchoolDesegregation,presented
at meeting of the American Sociological Association (September, 1978), publishedinWash.
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(10) In 1976, the Court overreacted once again, this time to the
egalitarian excesses that had taken place in desegregation and other

cases since 1968. In Washington v. Davis,'1 8 an employment discrimination case, it announced another new doctrine: that the sef-executing
effect of the equal protection clause is to forbid racial discrimination
only if the discrimination is "intentional," though Congress can validly

prohibit action which has the effect of putting one race at a disadvantage even if the intention to do so is not proved." 9 This doctrine has
since been applied in other areas, such as exclusionary zoning and leg-

islative reapportionment. 20
(11) Finally, in 1977, the Court encountered for the first time an
official effort to favor nonwhites' 2 ' at the expense of another minority.
In United Jewish Organizationsv. Carey, involving the revision of
state legislative districts in Brooklyn, it held that effort constitutional.
The Justices expressed a bewildering array of divergent views, four of
them saying that Congress has power to accord special treatment to

nonwhites and the others either disagreeing or remaining silent on this
question. Justice Marshall abstained entirely.
In the Bakke case, the Supreme Court of California had held that

Allan Bakke, a white applicant, had been denied the equal protection
of the laws when he was excluded from admission to a state medical
school (University of California at Davis) which reserved a quota of 16

places for blacks, Chicanos, Asians, and American Indians in its entering class of 100 if as many as 16 such nonwhites who applied for preferential treatment satisfied certain minimum requisites for
Post, Aug. 23, 1978, § A, at 6, col. 1. See also Milwaukee Schools FoundBiased, N.Y. Times,
June 2, 1978, § A, at 12, col. 5. Cf. id, June 6, 1978, § A, at col. 5.
118. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
119. This doctrine was adumbrated in Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944), so far as it
concerns the requirement of "intentional" discrimination to make out a violation of the
equal protection clause, but any such requirement was explicitly abandoned in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962). See BY WHAT RIGHT?, supra note 29, at 132-33.
120. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (legislative reapportionment); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)
(exclusionary zoning).
121. The nonwhites consisted of blacks, Puerto Ricans, and a small number of other
nonwhites such as orientals. As will appear, I think it may be material to distinguish between discrimination in favor of blacks and discrimination in favor of other nonwhites; that
is to say, I believe that in view of the history of the Civil War Amendments Congress should
be held to have power to authorize discrimination in favor of blacks while not thus favoring
other nonwhites. On the other hand, since the words of the Amendments do not single out
blacks, I doubt that the self-executing effect of their provisions should lead to special treatment for blacks, or for other nonwhites, any more than for whites. Cf. BY WHAT RIGHT?,
supra note 29, at 246, 335.
122. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
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consideration.' 23 The California Court also enjoined the school from
considering race as a factor in the future administration of its admissions system. 124 The 1964 Civil Rights Act forbade the states to engage
in racial discrimination in federally financed education,' 25 but the
Supreme Court of California did not rely on the federal statute in
reaching its decision. The United States Supreme Court's task was to
decide whether this quota system favoring nonwhites violated either
the 1964 Act or the equal protection clause, and whether the California
Court had erred in holding that the equal protection clause forbids consideration of race as a factor in future admissions.
No precedent bore squarely on the issues facing the Court. It had
held that the equal protection clause does not, of its own force, forbid
"unintended" (probably meaning "unwanted") though foreseen disadvantage to racial groups, white or nonwhite, in employment, 126 zoning, 127 and legislative apportionment1 28 cases, but these decisions did
not involve the 1964 Civil Rights Act. On the other hand, in one of the
foregoing cases' 29 the Court had declared in considered dictum that
Congress has the power to broaden the coverage of the equal protection
clause by forbidding "unintended" but actual disadvantage to non130
whites in employment. And in the legislative apportionment case,
involving the 1965 Voting Rights Act rather than the 1964 Act, the
Court had held that Congress had validly authorized official action
favorifig nonwhites at some "unintended" but foreseen cost to a white
religious minority.' 3 ' Thus, the Court had to break new ground in deciding whether the California Supreme Court had erred in holding, on
federal grounds, that the exclusion of Allan Bakke was illegal and that
the medical school could not consider race as a factor in future
admissions.
Underlying the issues facing the Supreme Court in Bakke were
123. 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976).
124. Id. at 38, 553 P.2d at 1155, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
125. Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976),
provides that "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial asistance."
126. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
127. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
128. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 1,44 (1977).
129. See note 126 supra.
130. See note 128 supra.
131. The effect of the legislative redistricting upheld in United Jewish Organizations .
Carey was to diminsh the political strength of a community of Hasidic Jews.
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deeper questions, the answers to which could have pointed the way to a
wise resolution of the controversy:
(1) Ought the Court to reaffirm, at long last, what it had proclaimed in 1873 but denied in 1883 and thereafter, namely that the primary purpose of the Civil War Amendments was extirpation of the
cultural residues of slavery? Reaffirmation of that proposition would
imply recognition that blacks, as descendants of slaves, still suffer a
special handicap presently justiying favored treatment by Congressthough favored treatment is not constitutionally required, and indeed
may often be against the interests of blacks themselves. (That reaffirmation is, I think, long overdue.)
(2) Ought the Justices to confess that the Court itself, because of
its misinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases, the 1883 Civil Rights Cases, and the 1896 ruling in
Plessy v. Ferguson, bears primary responsibility for the nation's slowness in making good the national commitment to extirpation of the
remnants of slavery-a commitment formally embodied in the Civil
War Amendments? Only such a confession would open the way to acknowledgment of the extent to which blacks have suffered unjustly at
the hands of the nation, and recognition of a national obligation to
repair the wrong. (That acknowledgment is, I think, also long
overdue.)
(3) If it be granted that the nation as a whole owes an obligation
to blacks, how can that obligation rightly be satisfied? Must the cost be
borne by the nation as a whole, as through expenditure of general revenues for special training, work, housing, education, and social services
needed to make up the lost century?13 2 Or can the cost rightly be
loaded upon a relatively few unlucky whites who, like Allan Bakke,
must be shouldered aside if the state and local governments and their
public institutions such as universities are required or invited to assume
a burden that properly.belongs to the whole national community? (The
second alternative, I think, is acceptable only if two wrongs make a
right.)
(4) Let us assume that the second of the alternatives just mentioned will be deemed unacceptable on the simple ground that whites
like Allan Bakke bear no more responsibility for slavery and its aftermath than do the progeny of Yankee ship owners who fattened on the
slave trade, or the progeny of Southern planters who fattened on slave
132. There is precedent, in the G.I. Bill of Rights and other veterans' programs, for
assistance of this kind to those who have suffered or been placed at a relative disadvantage
by reason of the execution of governmental policies.
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labor. Then should it make a difference that the advantage to nonwhites has resulted from the open, unselfconscious operation of a numerical quota system rather than the covert, hard-to-prove
disingenuousness of "affirmative action" programs that take race into
account "but only as one factor out of many"? (It is less than twenty
years since covert anti-black discrimination through similar adminis-

trative abracadabra formed an effective barrier to implementation of
Brown v. Board of Education-almostto the point of nullification.) 3 3
The reader will have had little difficulty in divining how and on
what rationale I think the Bakke case should have been decided. I
believe that the self-executing effect of the equal protection clause
should not have been passed upon, because Congress had acted: it had
forbidden racial discrimination in federally financed education in the
1964 Civil Rights Act. Whether that statute be interpreted as reinforcing the equal protection clause and extending its reach, or as narrowing

its scope by permitting anti-white discrimination that the equal protection clause would otherwise have been held to forbid, I submit that
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress to enact

it, previous dicta to the contrary notwithstanding.' 34
On the question of statutory interpretation, I know of nothing in
the legislative history-at least as canvassed in the supplemental briefs
that the Court invited and in the several opinions of the Justices-to

suggest that Congress, in enacting the 1964 Act, was attempting to deal
in any way with the allocation of the cost of repairing the effects of the

century of neglect. It is doubtless true that discrimination against nonwhites was the dominant concern of Congress. It may also be true,
though this is intrinsically unprovable, that Congress if asked would
have declared that discrimination in favor of nonwhites is consistent
133. See Lusky, supra note 104, at 1167 el seq.
134. In a footnote to his opinion for the Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966), Justice Brennan-having held that Congress has power under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment to broaden the reach of the equal protection clause-declared:
"Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent,. . . § 5 does not grant Congress power to exercise discretion in the other direction and to enact 'statutes so as in effect to dilute equal
protection and due process decisions of this Court.' We emphasize that Congress' power
under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5
grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees." Id. at 651 n.10.
Justice Brennan's premise appears to be too narrow to support his conclusion. At least in
some cases, the effect of "broadening" the equal protection clause to favor one group will
work a corresponding disadvantage on one or more others; and, as to them, the reach of the
clause will be restricted. In Katzenbach v. Morgan itself, the effect of upholding a federal
statute banning English-language literacy tests for Puerto Ricans (which the Court was not
willing to prohibit under the self-executing effect of the equal protection clause) was to dilute the vote of others.
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with national policy. But that question does not appear to have been
raised in the debates on Title VI, perhaps because anti-white discrimination in federally financed programs seemed at that time to be so far
in the future. Moreover, neither the 1964 Act nor its legislative history
evidences the careful modulation-limitations based on circumstances
and temporal duration-that should have, and probably would have,
accompanied Congressional approval of racial inequality in the short
run to achieve racial equality in the longer run.
In my opinion, Congress therefore cannot rightly be thought to
have authorized anti-white discrimination in federally financed education. Nor do I see any basis for the utterly remarkable proposition that
Congress intended to authorize covert but not overt anti-white discrimination in federally financed education; in 1964 the consequences of
covert anti-black discrimination through sophisticated administrative
"plans" were too painfully evident to be overlooked or used as a model
for civil rights legislation. 3 ' I conclude that Congress intended the
words of the 1964 Act to carry their usual meaning-that federally
financed education was not to be affected by any racial discrimination,
overt or covert-and that the California decision should therefore have
been affirmed.
Before examining the Court's actual disposition of the case, which
was based on reasoning quite different from that which I have
sketched, it is appropriate to point out that the implied judicial power
doctrine combines the firmness the Court needs for enforcement of national commitments where the states and the other two federal
branches cannot do as good a job, with the flexibility it needs for submission to the political branches in areas where their competence is
superior. The delicate problem of making up for the long delay in
moving toward the promised land, in which skin color will be regarded
with no more interest or concern than hair or eye color, calls for the
most careful continuing modulation with respect to time, place, and
subject matter. Congress appears to be as sensitive now to the dangers
inherent in racial prejudice as were the Congresses that enacted the
several civil rights acts in the decade that followed the Civil War. (The
Court can claim primary credit for that renewed sensitivity, by reason
of its increasingly firm condemnations of white supremacist action
since World War II;136 and Congress will probably remain sensitive,
135. For example, Virginia's "massive resistance" to school desegregation was just being
dealt with by the Court. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
136. By WHAT RIGHT, supra note 29, at Ch. XIII.
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because the Court has at long last encouraged enfranchisement of
blacks137 and has opened the channels of political expression to
them.' 3 8 ) Had the Bakke case been decided on the reasoning I have
proposed, Congress would be entirely free to authorize such affirmative
action programs as it deemed wise, while avoiding the adverse effect on
a few unlucky whites, one would hope, by providing federal funds for
expanding the opportunities of blacks and perhaps (though not necessarily) other nonwhites, without reducing the opportunities of others.
Those scholars who approve whatever innovations may from time
to time seem desirable to a majority of the Justices, for "modernization" of the Constitution, 139 might have had little difficulty in proposing a judicial modus- operandi and formulating a rationale for an
opinion of the Court in the Bakke case. The logic of their position
seems consistent with a simple procedure under which the Justices
would take a vote and count heads in favor of affirmance, reversal, or
remand for further findings, and then construct a constitutional rule
adequate to serve as a major premise for the desired result. That rule
could be sweeping if, as in Brown v. Boardof Education,4 five or more
Justices agreed on a broad formulation, or, if they did not, it could be
narrow. My objection would be, of course, that adoption of that approach would destroy the special utility of judicial review. The Court
would be, and would soon be recognized as being, not the guardian of
those basic national commitments which, together with the text, comprise our Constitution, but simply another legislative house. No longer
would judicial review be available to bridge social schisms
too deep to
4
be healed through the give and take of legislation.' 1
Raoul Berger and others (if any) 42 who would bound the Fourteenth Amendment by the horizons of those who adopted it, would also
have had little difficulty in proposing a judicial modus operandi and
formulating a rationale for an opinion of the Court in the Bakke case.
He (or they) would assert simply that the Amendment was adopted at a
time of severe "Negrophobia" and that it was intended to do no more
than provide for color-blind treatment of racial groups---either through
its self-executing effect or through its authorization of Congressional
action.' 43 My objection to this approach would be that both Court and
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 234-42.
Id. at 247.
See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).

141.

BY WHAT RIGHT?, supra note 29, at 41-42.

142. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
143. See text accompanying note 71 supra. Actually, Berger argues that the Amendment
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Congress would be left powerless to satisfy, through legitimation of affirmative action or otherwise, the national obligation to do what can be
done to retrieve the century lost.
In examining the Court's actual disposition of the Bakke case, to
which I now turn, the foregoing discussion permits me to be brief. No
opinion gained majority acceptance. Indeed, no fewer than eight Justices dissented; only Justice Powell had the pleasure of seeing his views
prevail. Each of his eight colleagues concurred in part of his opinion
and not the rest of it, but four of them concurred in one part and a
different four in the other. The Justices produced a total of six opinions, including that of Justice Powell, none of which was an "opinion
of the Court" and only one of which-Justice Powell's-serves as an
accurate memorandum of the reason for affirmance of the California
Court's judgment in favor of Alan Bakke and reversal of its judgment
forbidding consideration of race in future admissions.
Four members of the Court, Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens, joined in a single opinion authored
by Justice Stevens."' Their view was that the 1964 Civil Rights Act
forbids racial discrimination of the overt type exemplified by the medical school's quota system, so that the California judgment should be
affirmed. They reserved judgment as to the validity of affirmative action programs that consider race as one of several material factors,
which I have characterized as programs of covert discrimination, 145
since they understood the California judgment to contain no injunction
against consideration of race in future admissions other than Bakke's.
The logic of Justice Stevens' opinion, however, points to the invalidity
of affirmative action programs involving covert racial discrimination.
Four other members of the Court, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, disagreed toto caelo. Amongst them, they wrote a
total of four opinions. 146 Their view, with minor variations of emphasis and detail, 147 was that the 1964 Act was not intended to change the
was not intended to guarantee even color-blind treatment except with respect to a "limited
group of privileges." See, e.g., GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 166-67, 173, 191.
144. 438 U.S. at 408-21.
145. For an explanation of this characterization, see text accompanying notes 151-55
infra.
146. Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun all concurred in Justice Brennan's opinion,
438 U.S. at 324, and each of the three also delivered an individual opinion of his own. Id. at
379, 387, 402.
147. Justice White, in his separate opinion, disagreed with all of his colleagues on the
question whether individuals, such as Bakke, have standing to complain of violations of
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. He concluded that they do not have standing, but this
conclusion did not affect his vote. Id. at 379-87. Justice Marshall, in his separate opinion,
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scope of the equal protection clause and so is congruent with it, that the
equal protection clause makes official racial discrimination presumptively, but only presumptively, unconstitutional, and that affirmative
action programs designed to overcome substantial underrepresentation
of nonwhite minorities in the medical profession-including but by no
means limited to the medical school's quota system-possess sufficient
public value to overcome the presumption of invalidity and render
them lawful. They therefore voted for reversal.
Justice Powell agreed and disagreed with both groups. He agreed
with the second on all points except in his view that the particulartype
of affirmative action program used in Bakke's case-a rigid, numerical
quota system, involving discrimination that I have characterized as
overt-is "unnecessary" for achievement of the legitimate objectives of
diversifying the student body and increasing the number of nonwhite
physicians, and hence fails to overcome the presumption of invalidity
to which racial discrimination is subject. Thus he cast his vote with the
first group for Bakke's admission; but he voted with the second group
to reverse the injunction against consideration of race in future
admissions.
The foregoing discussion of the case would be incomplete if I were
not to reveal my evaluation of the Court's handiwork. Yet, because it
has only indirect relevance to the subject matter of the present symposium, evaluation must be limited to the bare statement of a number of
observations, reserving full argument and explanatory documentation
for another occasion. Even thus limited, I hope and believe that my
observations will serve to highlight the immensity of the stakes in the
choice between Raoul Berger's approach to the application of the Fourteenth Amendment and other approaches that I have discussed.
Where, as here, the views of the Justices are fragmented so thoroughly that eight of them dissent and six opinions are written-none of
which speaks for a majority of the nine, so that there is no "opinion of
the Court"-it is hard to see why any opinions should be published at
all. The practice that is followed when the voting Justices divide 4-4 or
3-3, namely to announce the result without opinion,14- has much to
commend it here. The Bakke case's value as a precedent is minuscule;
emphasized the fact that the black minority has a basis for claiming special consideration,
and the fact that the Court itself had been primarily responsible for the century of delay in
honoring the purpose of the Civil War Amendments, to wipe away the '.estiges of slavery.
.d. at 387-402. Justice Blackmun, in his separate opinion, emphasized that minorities are
significantly underrepresented in the medical and other professions. Id. at 402-08.
148. R.L. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 212 (5th ed. 1978).
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it leaves open the legality of all affirmative action programs that are not
substantially identical with the quota system used by the particular
school involved in the case, and that type of program is apparently not
common. The moral authority that enables the Court to resolve deeply
divisive conflicts through judicial review does not appertain to the Justices individually. Be they wise as Solomon, the people regard them as
mere non-elected individuals; general popular respect is reserved for
the Court, and for the Constitution whose "ultimate interpreter" it
claims to be.
Nor can the multiplicity of opinions be justified on the ground that
it helps lawyers predict how the next case will be decided. At best, the
counting of judicial votes is an uncertain and unreliable procedure as
compared with analysis of mature doctrine embodied in an opinion of
the Court. Moreover, some of the Justices have demonstrated their
readiness to shift their positions from case to case. A lawyer examining
the positions of Justices Brennan and Rehnquist in UnitedJewish Organizations v. Carey,'4 9 decided in 1977, might reasonably have predicted
that their votes in the 1978 Bakke case would be the exact opposite of
what they actually were; at least, that was my guess. (Could the intervening debate that saturated the media have played a part?)
The most obvious explanation for fragmentation of the Justices'
views is that, as I have already suggested, they lack the guidance of
agreed neutral principles. Some if not all of them seem to recognize the
constraint of nothing outside themselves, to follow no star except each
one's conception of the public welfare, and to regard themselves as
masters rather than servants of the law.
As a resolution of the important conflict that the case presented,
the Bakke decision was almost as great a failure as the Court's remarkable refusal to decide the DeFunis15 ° case, on newly invented mootness
grounds, four years before. The blacks have a large and legitimate
grievance; so do whites who are called on to bear a disproportionate
part of the cost of redressing that grievance. Both rightly invoke basic
national commitments-extirpation of the vestiges of slavery on the
one hand, equality of individual opportunity on the other. Still a third
basic national commitment-preservation of academic freedom, as part
of the freedom of speech and the right of peaceable assembly-is also
implicated. The culprits who are responsible for the present state of
affairs have long since absconded to the next world. The Court's strong
voice is needed to point the way to realization of all three national
149. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
150. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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commitments, as nearly as may be. Even a five to four decision could
have called upon Congress to play the part that it alone is well
equipped to play.
The Court could also have avoided the apparent legitimation of
covert racial discrimination, which school administrators and public officials so avidly seized upon the moment the decision was handed
down.151 I realize that Justice Powell argued vigorously against the
suggestion that "an admissions program which considers race only as
one factor is simply a subtle and more sophisticated-but no less effec152
tive-means of according racial preference than the Davis program."
I realize further that, in taking this position, he was accepting the view
tendered by the amicus curiae brief of Columbia University, Harvard
University, Stanford University and the University of Pennsylvania,
and by Professor Archibald Cox who presented oral argument on behalf of the University of California. Finally, I confess I have heard that
Justice Powell's opinion has won the admiring approval of more than
one distinguished member of the federal courts of appeals.
Nevertheless, I am not alone in doubting that there is a significant
difference between the overtly discriminatory admissions system that
confronted Bakke and more "subtle" and "sophisticated" systems that
would allow his exclusion through an exercise of administrative discretion based on consideration of race as one factor out of several. 153 Not
one of Justice Powell's eight colleagues was willing to express approval
of this central proposition, adoption of which enabled him to occupy
the position of lone "swing man." One cannot know what led the eight
other Justices to withhold their approval, but it is easy to hypothesize a
reason: Justice Powell seemed able to adduce in support of his view
only an assumption of goodfaith on the part of admissions officers:
"[A] court would not assume that a university, professing to employ a
facially nondiscriminatory admissions policy, would operate it as a
cover for the functional equivalent of a quota system."'154 But this assumption is open to the most serious doubt. Much of the massive
Southern resistance to public school desegregation was accomplished,
with long-continued success, through resort to facially nondiscriminatory plans that included large room for the exercise of administrative
151. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 29, 1978, § A at 1, col. 4; id., June 30. 1978, § A at 1,col.
4; 4 COLUM. UNiv. REc. No. 1, at I, col. 1 (July 18, 1978); Huffinan, EEOC.IgnoresBakke
Loopholes inAffrmativeAction Guides, I LEGAL TIMES No. 10, at 2, col. 1 (August 7, 1978).
152. 438 U.S. at 318.
153. My doubt is not a new one. See By WHAT RIGHT?, supranote 29, at 3.
154. 438 U.S. at 318.
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discretion. 55 The same is true in other areas, such as the use of literacy
tests for would-be voting registrants. 56 In short, however sincerely
Justice Powell may have believed that administrators are sanspeur et
sans reproche, history does not seem to be on his side. If his position
necessarily implies approval of systems that provide a fertile matrix for
racial discrimination, it is not unfair to say that he favors such a result
even if he denies it; one is held responsible for the foreseeable consequences of his acts, though he may deplore them.
The Court's unnecessary and unwarranted failure to resolve the
conflict presented by "reverse discrimination" can be expected to exacerbate rather than ease existing social tensions. Proponents as well as
opponents of affirmative action find support in the outcome of the case.
A great increase in litigation is predictable from the face of Justice
Powell's opinion. Unless and until the Court does a better job, each
different type of affirmative action program must pass judicial muster
as being "necessary" before its legality vel non can be known.
The Court has thus neglected the basic value of judicial review, 57
and has further jeopardized its status as legitimate keeper of the
Constitution.
Conclusion
What price must the Court pay to rehabilitate its threatened legitimacy? The price I propose-submission to the demands of the implied
judicial power doctrine for (a) self-restraint and (b) articulation of the
Court's reasons for claiming the final word on constitutional questions-may not be a light one. But the price that Raoul Berger insists
upon-repudiation of much of the Court's most valuable work in such
fields as racial discrimination, legislative representation, and criminal
procedure-is far higher. In my opinion it is far higher than is necessary or right.

155. See Lusky, supra note 104, at 1167 et seq.
156. The dreary tale is related by Chief Justice Warren in his opinion for the Court in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
157. See By WHAT RIGHT?, supra note 29, at ch. II.

